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Introduction
Debate in the area of human resource management includes as one of its focuses the role and status of the HR function and the factors that determine that status (Storey, 1992: Ulrich, 2007: Gennard and Kelly, 2007). Yet in an era of increasing focus on ‘boundaryless’ organizations, and HR in supply chains (see Marchington, et al, 2005), there is little analysis of how inter-organizational relations shape not just HR policies, but the status and reputation of the HR function. This question is particularly pertinent in supplier organizations where studies highlight how the power of the purchaser can detrimentally influence employment outcomes in provider organizations (Rainnie, 1989: Marchington, et al, 2005). Moreover, as the boundaryless form comes under more scrutiny in organizational analysis the influence of this factor on the status of the HR function remains a gap in our knowledge (Legge, 2007).

This paper explores the above themes by using as its focus purchaser – provider relations between state and voluntary sector in the UK. It begins by providing an outline of the literature on the HR function and how boundarylessness can be a factor in shaping its status and reputation. It then moves on to explore the specific context of the voluntary sector – state relationship focusing on the growth in dependency on government funding in recent years during the New Labour era and the subsequent influences this brings to HR outcomes. The status of the HR function within the sector is then explored empirically by an analysis of several qualitative studies undertaken by the author between 1998 – 2004.  This begins by an outline of the rationale and method of the two studies, followed by an overview of the findings. This is followed by a discussion and conclusion section that identifies specific influences from the inter-organizational environment and how they interact with more familiar elements that shape the status of the HR function. 

The HR function within boundaryless organizations
Many different types of HR/Personnel function are present in organizations with varying levels of influence (Caldwell and Storey, 2007). These include strategic ‘business partner’ models where the HR function makes proactive contributions by integrating HR policies into organizational strategy through ensuring long-term commitment among staff. Others identify HR as having a status far removed from the notion of ‘employee champion’ embracing job shedding, or those that are marginalized with little influence in comparison to other management functions (see Storey, 1992: Tyson and Fell, 1986: Ulrich, 1997: Gennard and Kelly, 2001). One of the most influential typologies include Ulrich’s (1997) four HR business partner roles that include the strategic partner, administrative expert, change agent and employee champion. Other typologies identify HR in strategic or ‘Changemaker’ roles, but also include the ‘Advisor’ to line managers in newly devolved structures where the latter are predominant. Similarly, the ‘Handmaiden’ role has HR serving line managers, but in a much diminished capacity arising out of restructuring and budget cuts. ‘Regulators’ are more proactive in the mould of the classic IR manager devising, defending procedural rules, but are removed from strategic matters, where their expertise is threatened by newly assertive business managers (Storey, 1992).

The factors identified as leading to these diverse outcomes for the HR function include a lack of representation on the main boards of companies; limited input into strategic business plans; the decentralization of employee relations policies, leading to the break up of corporate HR departments; a lack of business focus among HRM specialists; financial short-termism in the behaviour of UK companies undermining long-term HR projects; a poor profile of HR among senior executives because of the intangibility of many of its supposed benefits; fragmentation and challenges to the expertise of internal HR from functions such as accountancy, the legal profession and outside consultants; the attitude of Chief Executives; and the competencies and will of HR managers to act strategically, and their capacity to bargain and negotiate with other organizational members to enhance their status (Kelly and Gennard, 2001: Kelly and Gennard, 2007: Truss, Gratton, Hope, Stiles and Zaleska, 2002: Buckley and Monks, 2004). 

One context that has not been widely visited within the above literature concerns the implications of boundaryless organizations. In recent years, a growing literature identified how HRM policy outcomes are shaped by inter-organizational relations through factors such as power relations between organizations, institutional norms, the influence of boundary spanners, the exercise of strategic choice by management and the management of risk. This leads to complex and changing influences on the HR domain by external agencies that can shape the working lives of employees (Marchington et al, 2005: Swart and Kinnie, 2002; Truss, 2004). Yet, few have scrutinized the implications of these inter-organizational dynamics and how they shape the status of the HR function.

Legge (2007) provides a bridge between these two literatures by presenting competing scenarios for the HR function that are shaped by whether inter-organizational relations are based on obligational or relational contracting (Sako, 1992). Under obligational contracts positive consequences for employment policies in supplier organizations are anticipated that include employee secondments across organizational boundaries, with accompanying training and career development opportunities and less external pressure on wages and conditions as in examples of exploitative supply chain relations (Rainnie, 1989). For the HR function, these relationships lead to its activity becoming more ambiguous and complex as individuals move across the boundaries of partner organizations, but the function can develop a strategic role in areas of performance management, training, career development, employee retention and the maintenance of high trust relations that sustain the partnership (Legge, 2007).

The pessimistic scenario sees HRM introduced in the context of arms length contracts (Sako,1992) that are short-term, competitive and cost based. Here, the lack of resources leads to failure to develop a coherent and consistent set of HR policies because of the influence of the purchaser. HR may be forced to implement changes to pay structures as part of a cost-cutting environment enforced by the external client undermining efforts to maintain high trust relations with staff and training and development. This, in turn, leads to industrial relations problems as control over pay is taken out of the employer’s hands despite agreements with internal unions (Marchington et al, 2005). The expertise and status of the function will be further undermined by the power of the client organizations, as they may play a major part in dictating HR policies, leading to inconsistencies in HR practice because of competing goals, and a blurring of the boundaries of who is the employer (Legge, 2007). Tensions subsequently emerge in areas of employee relations practice such as discipline where power in such decisions may not lie with the legal employer, but with the employer’s clients (Rubery, Earnshaw and Marchington, 2005). Within this scenario, the HR function becomes marginalized and struggles to manage and resolve such tensions.

Legge (2007) also acknowledges the variable nature and complexity of contractual relationships (see Marchington, et al 2005: Scarborough, 2000: Bresnan, 1996: Hunter, et al, 1996). The obligational  - arms length dichotomy (Sako, 1992) is a continuum with different consequences for purchaser – provider arrangements. These multiple outcomes are shaped by management’s ability to exercise varying levels of strategic choice within their external environment (Child, 1972) through suppliers establishing diverse relations with a variety of purchasers characterized by varying degrees of dependency, and the exercise of choice by suppliers over who to contract with (Bresnan, 1996: Hunter, et al, 1996). This leaves us with the likelihood that there will be differing outcomes regarding HRM policy and the status of the HR function itself among supplier organizations that reflect multiple forms of contracts along the obligational – arms length continuum, which shift according to changes in power relations between purchasers and providers through a ‘renegotiation of order’ between the parties (Truss, 2004).
 
It is now useful to explore the possible implications for HR policies and the status of the HR function in the voluntary sector in the context of its inter-organizational relationship with government.

The voluntary sector and outsourcing in the UK
Outsourcing to the UK voluntary sector has been pursued by successive Conservative and Labour governments, because of the sector’s perceived capacity to innovate and add value to public services (Kendall, 2003).  This has led to the voluntary sector delivering mainstream public services in social care, that were previously provided by statutory bodies (Billis and Harris, 1992; Harris, Rochester and Halfpenny, 2001).  This has had implications for income security and levels of employment (Wilding, et al, 2004). The sector’s largest source of income in 2003/04 stemmed from government grants and contracts at 38 per cent, increasing from 28 per cent in 1995 (Wainwright et al., 2006). This has been accompanied by significant employment growth. In 2004, the UK voluntary sector workforce stood at 608, 000 (approximately 488,000 full-time equivalents) or 2.2 per cent of the total UK workforce, compared with 408,000 employees in 1995. Woman account for over two thirds of that workforce (415,000), half of whom are part-timers, (Wainwright, et al, 2006: Wilding, et al, 2004). 

In assessing the implications of the above inter-organizational climate on the HR function, this paper in a similar vein to Legge (2007) outlines optimistic and pessimistic scenarios.

The Optimistic Scenario
A series of changes to purchaser-provider relationships in the New Labour era form the basis of the optimistic scenario for the HR function in the voluntary sector. As outlined in the last section, the growth in employment in the sector through increased government contracting will lead to demands on the HR function to engage in the recruitment, induction and training of staff. At the same time, the influence of institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) will lead to voluntary organizations applying changes to HR policies to achieve legitimacy in the quasi-market. Specifically, outsourcing has been accompanied by calls for commercial private sector practices, including in people management, to emerge as the preferred approach for the sector, with voluntary organizations expected to demonstrate that they are ‘business-like’ in order to participate in the delivery of public services (Perri 6 & Kendall, 1997: Tonkiss and Passey, 1999: Harris et al, 2001). Accompanying this, there are broader macro level factors effecting all sectors to varying degrees through the increasing complexity of employment law that enforce other institutional norms on the sector such as changes to Criminal Disclosure Regulations, and the plethora of statutes introduced by New Labour since 1997, such as family friendly legislation, Working Time Regulations, the Minimum Wage, and changes to individual and collective employment rights etc (see Smith and Morton, 2006). There will also be efforts by purchasers to monitor the quality of the workforce and minimize the level risk from contracting out to the sector through ensuring compliance with ‘best practice’ in areas such as recruitment and discipline. Other demands on organizations to have a dedicated HR function would also include the interpretation of TUPE regulations as outsourcing by the state will include transfers of staff between public and voluntary agencies. Combined, these pressures will lead to increasing demands for the expertise of the HR function to interpret these statutes and requirements into policy, especially given previous studies in the sector have highlighted problems with high numbers of employment tribunal cases (Cunningham, 2000). 

Beyond this growth in influence over matters of procedure and policy, the HR function could also be involved in implementing predominantly ‘soft’ HR policies in the sector. Traditionally, people management in the sector has reportedly had to be sensitive to employee needs by treating them with the respect and values organizations aspire to for clients (Ball, 1992). Changes to the nature of contractual relations between state and voluntary sector will further encourage this. Commentators have argued that the relationship with New Labour is ‘the most favourable the sector has experienced’ (Brindle, 2005, pp.9), and a break away from predominantly ‘arms length’ contractual relations under previous Conservative regimes. Policy initiatives such as the Compact, Best Value and ‘full-cost-recovery’ (Kendall, 2003) have been established to offer a greater focus on quality in service provision, more longer-term (three years) contracts and guarantees of covering all of the sector’s costs associated with taking on government contracts. 

The implication of these policies is that there will be far less ‘power sub-contracting’ (Colling, 2000) leading to less pressure on employment insecurity, and pay and conditions. Moreover, specific policies such as training and career development will be placed at the centre of organizational strategies because of the increased state regulation of the workforce through the introduction of new Care Standards and the requirements for workforce accreditation through NVQ/SVQ qualifications on all care providers (Cunningham, 2008). This, in turn, can place HR at the centre of organizational strategies to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of funders and regulators given its expertise in the area of training and development.

The Pessimistic Scenario
The pessimistic scenario regarding the status of HR function in voluntary organizations is based on the imbalance of power between the parties within purchaser- provider relations, and the reality rather than the rhetoric of New Labour’s relations with the sector. The external monitoring of employment policies and practice, for example, can lead to detrimental outcomes for employees and the HR function in provider organizations as purchasers interfere with internal HR matters (Rubery, Earnshaw and Marchington, 2005). Voluntary organizations are no less vulnerable to such pressures, as local authorities contract out services for vulnerable people to save on cost, but still retain legal responsibility for what remain public services. 

Moreover, if competition and cost control remain dominate characteristics of the sector’s relationship with the state, then there will be detrimental out comes for the HR function. Best Value, for instance, stipulates that service providers are obliged to achieve annual efficiency savings of two per cent, leading to pressure on terms and conditions of employment (Keenan, 2000: Martin, 2002: Geddes, 2001). Programmes such as Supporting People which many voluntary organizations have taken on through government contracts has experienced significant  re-provisioning of services and drives for efficiency savings (Sullivan, 2004: National Audit Commission, 2005). The Compacts are seen as lacking any rigorous enforcement mechanism to ensure long-term funding for the sector (Kendall, 2003: Osborne, 2001). The outcome of the ‘full cost recovery initiative’ is also uncertain given that it acknowledges that the financial position of local authorities will vary across the regions and contract awards will reflect this (National Audit Commission, 2005). Significantly, it has been found that only 12 per cent of charities delivering public services reported that they obtain full cost recovery in all cases (Charity Commission, 2007). This suggests little prospect for the HR function in the sector to be at the forefront of implementing a range of HR policies aimed at maintaining high commitment in the sector.

In such an environment, the implications for the HR function itself is that it will be marginalized located out-with senior management circles (board-level) because of problems associated with quantifying its contribution to organizational success, especially if it is advocating a programme of ‘soft’ intangible HR investments. Instead, the HR function could find itself implementing pay restructuring, struggling to meet government targets on workforce accreditation because of lack resources for training and development, and coping with problems of recruitment and retention because of low staff morale and problems with the perception of the sector as a poor employer.

While the above scenarios are useful, again, it is likely that they are part of a continuum and that variation in outcomes will occur depending on the degree to which contractual relations between state and voluntary sector are arms-length or obligational. Furthermore, this paper is not claiming that the inter-organizational environment is the sole determinant of these outcomes rather the aim is to identify specific influences and ascertain how they interact with other factors that shape the status of the HR function. The paper now addresses three questions:

	To what degree do HR specialists within voluntary organizations that have contractual relations with the state find themselves managing HR in the context of either obligational or arms-length contracts?

	What are the implications for the nature of employment policies in voluntary organizations in these circumstances?

	What are the implications for the status of the HR function in this environment?

What now follows is an outline of the method of this study, followed by findings, discussion and concluding sections.

Method
The data for this paper is drawn from two qualitative studies within UK voluntary organizations undertaken between 1998 – 2004. The rationale for analyzing the results from the two studies is that they were undertaken at key points in the era of New Labour’s relationship with the voluntary sector, and so provide a measure of the progress of HR’s status over a key period of development in the inter-organizational relationship between state and voluntary sector. The first was undertaken in 1998 when the sector’s relationship with the state continued to be shaped by previous Conservative administrations, and contractual relations could arguably be seen to be predominantly ‘arms length’, and where much of the pressure on terms and conditions of employment characteristic of the Conservative era would remain in place. The second study was undertaken between 2002 – 2004 when much of the New Labour agenda of Compacts, Best Value, new care standards, accreditation of the workforce and ‘full-cost recovery’ were supposedly beginning to shape purchaser – provider relations and employment outcomes in the sector in a more positive fashion, and, in line with the aforementioned literature, we would arguably anticipate more favourable outcomes for the HR function as obligational contracts became more common.

The studies involved qualitative face-to-face interviews with HR specialists and other management functions with responsibility for managing HR. The focus of these studies has been on HR outcomes in the context of relations with external governmental funding bodies. Although not strictly longitudinal because there is no overlap between organizations across the studies, they did cover identical areas of investigation, i.e. the nature of contractual relations between purchasers and providers, the influence of those relations on aspects of HR policy and practice, and the consequences for the status of the HR function. 

The first study involved interviewing HR specialists (thirty-one), or managers responsible for managing HR (seventeen) in forty eight voluntary organizations. These were drawn from voluntary sector respondents predominantly from the health and social care sectors in England. Twenty of these organizations were concerned with providing adults and young people with disabilities/special needs; twelve provided services to elderly people; six were providing services for those with issues of substance abuse; six operated in the area of children’s services; and four cared for homeless people.

The second study was a qualitative of analysis of twenty-four voluntary organizations located in Scotland undertaken in 2002 – 2004.  Participants comprised of twenty-one HR respondents, and three senior operational managers who had HR issues as part of their remit. The majority of organizations (eleven) cited people with disabilities/special needs as their beneficiaries. This is followed by organizations citing children and young people as their sole beneficiaries (four cases), while three respondents cited the elderly/old people. The remaining respondents (six) offered services to young people and adults with disabilities/special needs.
 
Across the two studies, the same procedure was utilized to analyse the data. All interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim. The analysis of each data set utilized the general analytical procedure favoured by Miles and Huberman (1994). This led to the coding of data and subsequent revisions to these codes. The themes that were drawn out included, the nature of contractual relations to organizational and state funding body relations; changes to HR policies; the impact of state funding bodies on those changes; and the impact on the status of the HR function. 

FINDINGS
The nature of state - voluntary sector-state relations
Despite the time difference between the two datasets, and the subsequent introduction during the duration of the second study of policy initiatives that were designed to offer partnership to the voluntary sector a degree of consistency emerges across the years in the state – voluntary sector relationship. That picture was one of variability and complexity, with varying degrees of vulnerability among providers to the cost pressures from the competitive market. A proportion of voluntary organizations across the two studies were subject to funding insecurity and ‘arms length’ contractual relations with funders. Here funding was short term (usually one year) with no guarantee of renewal. Where funding was renewed it was often the case that there would be no inflationary increase in income, with the expectation those organizations would provide the same level of service (or more). In the two studies a proportion of respondents reported how their organizations would draw from their own organizational reserves to make up this shortfall. Organizations within this category were generally those that had a high resource dependency on perhaps one or two funding bodies, such as smaller to medium sized organizations, but could also include several large organizations (500 or more employees) that were situated in one geographic area. 

In each study it was also clear that other respondents were more likely to experience more obligational relations and felt less pressure in terms of funding. This did not mean, however, that these voluntary organizations operated wholly within conditions of obligational contracts with all their purchasers. The larger organizations reported they operated in an extremely variable marketplace where some local authorities were able to pay increases in funding in line with inflation (generally obligational contracts), but that others did not (arms-length). The advantages these larger organizations had in terms of being able to secure a greater degree of stability came from a combination of factors such as their reputations in the market as being national providers; where they were able to offset shortages in funding in one area through subsidies from more generous contracts secured elsewhere; their ability to turn down ‘arms length’ contracts because of surplus of work; and drawing from their own resources and embarking on ‘partnership’ projects with local authorities, where they would contribute some of their own internal funding. The second study also revealed how government policies such as Best Value, The Compact and ‘full-cost recovery’, at this point, made limited impact on the climate of voluntary sector state relations. Evaluations of Best Value for instance found that in the main cost considerations were still the primary determinants in the award of contracts, rather than quality.  

The impact on employment policies in the voluntary sector
The paper identifies three broad areas of HRM policy that, while not being the exclusive domain of the HR function, were direct consequences of contracting with the state. These are – recruiting for values, ensuring procedural integrity, protecting organizational independence and coping with cost cutting and scarce HR resources.


Managers of procedural integrity
Closer relations with funding bodies across the two studies meant that in response to demands to meet institutional norms and retain or gain funding, respondents ensured their organizations met specified standards in employment policies and practice. In the first study, for example, over a third of organizations reported how they were required to revamp their disciplinary procedures. A HR Director summed up the change in culture that this heralded by stating:

When I first came here there was a feeling that charities had to be very charitable to their staff in terms of performance expectations…that has changed now. We are not in the commercial world… However, we do expect staff to be accountable…We will address issues of competency. There is much more commercial awareness than before.

The second study revealed continuation of these institutional pressures, reflecting the impact of government policies such as Best Value where local authorities expected voluntary sector providers to be ‘business like’ in their recruitment and selection, training and disciplining of staff. Similarly, standards around HRM policy and procedure were being established by the Care Commission, especially again in areas such as recruitment and selection, training and discipline. 

With regard to recruitment, data from the second study also revealed how policies around Disclosure of criminal activity had to be compliant with new regulations. At the same time, this had to be within the context of increasing employment in the sector, as respondents recruited more staff, especially through the onset of Supporting People contracts. Moreover, respondents from each study outlined how they felt the process of recruitment was qualitatively different from other sectors. On winning contracts, it was the role of the HR function to ‘recruit for values’ (HR respondent, second study). Here, respondents reported how HR spent a great deal of time and effort assessing whether candidates possessed the right value set that would lead them to embrace the organizational missions and values. In the second study, for example, at the level of Support Worker/Assistant, recruiters did not primarily look for qualifications, but a value set that would match the requirements of person-centred care. This would lead to respondents undertaking formal interviews but also, on occasion at a later stage in the process, bringing in service users and their families to assess the suitability of candidates. Once the right people were recruited, organizations reported how a great deal of effort was then expended in further inducting and training new employees into these values.

Defenders of organizational autonomy
In the context of local authorities managing risks associated with outsourcing, particularly those concerning avoiding litigation because of staff misconduct, respondents from each study revealed concerns over external scrutiny of certain employment policies by funding bodies. Here, respondents expressed concern regarding the vulnerability of employees who were subject to accusations of misconduct having to face interference by local authorities in such outcomes. These pressures appeared to intensify during the second study, where five HR respondents reported unwanted pressure from local authorities regarding disciplinary cases. This included a case where a local authority demanded an individual’s dismissal or funding would be withdrawn. The voluntary organization complied, and the case went to an employment tribunal, which found in the employee’s favour, with the employer having to absorb the subsequent costs. Another HR respondent faced similar pressures, but managed to persuade the local authority to relent, but again there was evidence of coercion, she stated:

That was difficult, because we didn’t want to upset them, but at the same time we were the employer and we had to exercise our own judgment. It was a tense time, and we were also up for renegotiating the contract, so it all happened at the wrong time. We did get it, but I actually think for a shorter term, which may or may not have had to do with the disciplinary issue, but at one point we were worried we might not even get it at all.


Another HR Director revealed challenges to the independence and autonomy of his organization as the employer through local authorities interfering once disclosure records had been publicised. He stated:

There is an ongoing debate at the moment with some councils who say that ‘we want the right of veto’ and we say now hang on ‘we are the employer’. So what do you do? Do you terminate someone’s contract for ‘some other substantial reason’ because these councils are saying ‘we are not going to provide that contract if you employ that person.

Cost cutting & scarce HR resources
Unsurprisingly, in the aforementioned climate of funding instability, a proportion of respondents had undergone a process of managing the move away from pay and other terms and conditions of employment that were comparable with local or health authority workers - approximately one third of organizations from the first study and just over half (thirteen) of those from the second. This financial environment also led to respondents across the two studies cutting conditions such as holiday entitlement, sick pay, and pensions. 

For those that continued to use local authority terms and conditions, this was not always an easy option as pay increases were regularly delayed because of difficulties in securing sufficient funding for cost of living pay awards. There were also fears about how the contract culture was leading to the creation of a two-tier workforce. In the first study one respondent noted:

Our salary wage costs are large and that makes it very difficult for us as an organization. I am aiming to cut the salary bill in the long run. It will mean for new starters they will have fewer increments and pay more related to cost of living (HR respondent).

In the second study funding streams such as Supporting People were leading to fears among HR respondents regarding the fragmentation of certain terms and conditions, such as sick pay, where funding did not fully cover the costs of comparable local authority sick pay schemes and that in the future workers hired under these contracts may receive different entitlements. 

Where funding insecurity arose, employment insecurity followed. In the first study, one respondent noted:

Anybody we bring in now is only guaranteed funding from a local authority for one year…We try and be up front with it to staff and attempt to re-deploy them if funding is cut.

In the second study despite government initiatives such as Best Value that encouraged the adoption of three year contracts by local authorities, their actual incidence was very ad-hoc with one year funding largely persisting. This led to even some of the larger organizations struggling to guarantee employment security for staff in certain projects to the extent that HR managers issued annual precautionary redundancy notices until funding was secured. 

This environment led HR respondents coming into conflict with unions. In the first study the emergence of collective grievances within the workplace was a catalyst for recognition efforts by unions, which were resisted by some organizations. Here, HR could be at the forefront of moves to counter-mobilize through creating alternative representative structures such as ‘Works Councils’. In three organizations in the second study where pay disputes occurred, ballots for action short of a strike (two cases) and strike action (one case) were held or threatened. In one of these cases the HR Manager was at the forefront of organizational efforts to counter-mobilize against the union’s campaign leading to a de facto de-recognition of the union.

Across the two studies there were limited resources to devote to ‘softer’ HR policies such as training and development. Half the respondents from the first study revealed how funders obliged them to improve their training, but did not provide sufficient resources for this. The following quote from a personnel manager was typical of the sentiments expressed by respondents in the first study:

They (local authorities) are increasingly interested in training. On the one hand they want us to do more training, on the other, they don’t like paying for it…they don’t really want to see the cost on funding applications.

The second study suggested that this climate was not radically altering despite statutory requirements to accredit the workforce with NVQ/SVQ qualifications.  Achieving or working towards these requirements was crucial in ensuring voluntary organizations maintained legitimacy and their ability to operate in the care market.  HR respondents were at the centre of reforming organizational training infrastructures to meet these demands. Respondents reported, however, that the sector was expected to largely absorb the costs of this training with little financial support from funders. A HR respondent pointed out how local authorities would use the rhetoric of partnership, but chances of receiving extra funds for SVQ qualifications were limited. She stated:

We are the ones that provide all these services and they (local authorities) did not pass on any of the additional training money…if we were an equal partner at the table when we are negotiating these things then it would be fine, but we aren’t its all tied up with economic power, money, power. So we are not an equal partner.

It is now useful to turn to the implications of the above for the HR function in the voluntary sector.

The Status of the HR function in the Voluntary Sector
There can be seen to be positive and negative outcomes for the HR function in the above environment. To begin with the positive, both studies revealed several HR respondents as having a strategic input into decisions within their organizations, by holding Directorships on Senior Management boards, reporting to the CEO, with full voting rights, inputting into key decisions regarding resourcing multiple contracts with funders, dealing with TUPE transfers and formulating training strategies. These practitioners were likely to be found in the larger organizations that were among the group outlined in an earlier section who were able to exercise some autonomy/strategic choice in their relations with funders because of multiple funding streams, wide geographic dispersion of services, and ability to turn down work. It was also the case that several of these respondents reported how their role owed something to the initiative of Chief Executives who advocated HR’s ascendancy to the senior decision-making in such a complex environment.

Even where the function was not a strategic player, broader changes to employment law, the aforementioned HR requirements of purchasers and recruiting for values positively combined to raising demands for the expertise of the HR function in formulating, developing and upgrading employment relations policies, practices and procedures. For these respondents, their role closely resembled the ‘Regulator’ ensuring employment rules were being observed. In some organizations across the two studies this meant the emergence of such specialists for the first time through a process of persuasion, negotiation and justification by post-holders of their worth. From the first study, one respondent noted how:

I started on a three month contract. They weren’t quite sure what the advantages were of having to employ somebody to do the job I do. 

However, the respondent added how she gradually justified her role through a process of updating all policies and procedures. What was also significant was that she had the support of the Chief Executive who when attending the interview for a short period stated:

We didn’t have any written policies or procedures so there was inconsistent practice. The association was making itself wide open to all sorts of accusations if we didn’t do something. I could see work needed to be done. I had to bring in an expert.

In the second study, a similar climate of having to prove the function’s worth was evident with a respondent from a children’s services organization stating:

One of the difficulties is that Personnel in this organisation has only been here for 5 years, which is very alarming given we have been in existence for 125. They finally decided they should have something to deal with the legal areas. We use our professional standards for the operational side so they face local authorities with the information they need. Over the last four years I have been setting things up to ensure that they follow best practice and keep us legal. We are just about there now thank goodness. The difficulty has sometimes been in convincing the organization to do this. They would say ‘well we have never had to do this before, we have never had personnel before why do we need to do this now’ - because the law says you have to.

It was also clear that this role while useful to organizations was not one that would guarantee the gradual evolution of the HR function to develop a strategic profile. Indeed, respondents from both studies who belonged to longer established HR functions indicated that this role eventually became more of a paper driven routine exercise, with some even casting doubt over whether there was detailed scrutiny by funders, and that they gave greater attention to non-HR issues in awarding contracts. For some this necessitated a process of further persuasion, negotiation and justification so that the function’s status could evolve. One Personnel Manager from the first study argued:

Here I think HR and personnel are seen as an administrative function at this moment in time. My role is to challenge that understanding to see it as not purely an organization or department that files things but actually takes information and converts it into data that helps the management decision-making process.

One route to such enhancing the status of the function was to contribute to organizational mission through assisting line managers in an ‘Adviser’ role. For example, high levels of absence could compromise an organization’s mission and reputation with funding bodies through disrupting continuity of care to service users. In the second study, one respondent reported how she advocated the employment of Regional HR specialists to support the central function in facilitating tighter control of absence through advising line managers in the regions. In response, the organization recruited Regional HR specialists on a temporary basis to prove their capacity to ensure line managers managed absence effectively. The intervention of these managers was seen as a success, which led to their status being made permanent.

Again in the second study, a proportion of HR specialists also proved their worth by assisting line managers who liaised and negotiated with external funders over new bids or retenders for existing services. One of the larger organizations established Regional HR Officers to support local managers who dealt with retenders and new bids for services. These discussions would include advice over hourly rates of pay, staffing levels, skill mixes and training requirements. This was arguably crucial to the maintenance of the mission of organizations in the study as issues such as skill mix, training etc. contributed to determining the operational boundaries of the quality of service provision preferred by providers and which could be the scene of some of the most protracted parts of negotiations with funders. 

For many respondents, however, because of the climate of funding insecurity the HR role was under-resourced and seen primarily as a cost that could also struggle to justify its existence. In the first study, for example, one Personnel Manager from a large UK-wide organization noted how:

I think if you were to talk to the typical manager, they would be sceptical about our (HR) overheads. In other words we are seen as a cost.

A further consequence of this, according to respondents, was that their role was always reactive, rather than proactive.

For others this meant there was no recognizable HR function as the organization saw its adoption as a cost that took away resources from front line services, so the role was given to accountants, senior managers or administrators. One respondent from the first study responsible for HR in her organization noted:

There is pressure from public sector purchasers. In that context we would try and put whatever resources we can into maintaining staffing levels at the point of service delivery and that remains a priority. It is quite hard to put resources into a central post. Every now and again some bright spark says its time we had a personnel office, but I think there would an outcry if there were less support workers as a result doing less face to face work (Administrator).

At the same time, it was the case that formalization and updating of policies and procedures was still undertaken, but was done so by individuals outside the HR profession. Here respondents reported how they would rely on a multitude of sources of advice such as sector lead bodies such as the NCVO, local voluntary sector associations, Cromers and specialists HR websites. For these organizations, there appeared little chance of HR progressing beyond this basic administrative function.

In the second study it became clear how specific government policies were possibly failing to rectify this issue. A central plank of the government’s ‘full cost recovery’ initiative was to facilitate the inclusion of overhead/ management costs in funding settlements. Respondents from the second study, however, reported how local authorities, in the main, failed to pay full overhead costs that would fund HR. This was seen as a major reason for the continued under-resourcing for the function.

The climate of inter-organizational relations also meant there were limited opportunities for HR to develop a role close to the notion of ‘employee champion’ ensuring a minimization of the impacts of external purchasers on employees and thus helping to secure continued employee commitment. A combination of low pay, HR’s role in counter-mobilization against unions, and poaching of staff by competitors from the public, private and voluntary sectors ensured that turnover of staff among some respondents across the two studies exceeded the sector’s average. Efforts to protect employees in circumstances where they came under the scrutiny of external funders in recruitment or disciplinary situations were also limited. Moreover, in some of the cases, it was suggested that the tensions between purchaser and providers over these issues became so intense that it came to a matter of legal correspondence, where the organization would resort to outside lawyers to defend their position rather than HR, so further bypassing and undermining the status of the function.

There were also incidents of a diminishing status of the function across the two studies, where the ‘renegotiation of order’ because of external cost pressures led to sacrifices in the HR function. This type of climate reflected the culture of many of the organizations in the two studies where ‘the mission’ was central and HR could be seen as a cost when resources became tight. A Personnel Manager in the first study from a large organization reported how she had been allowed onto the board of senior managers, but as funding became tighter there was a concerted effort to diminish her role and remove her because other managers felt HR issues were a drain on front line services. Here, a process persuasion by the respondent and the intervention of the CEO prevented this. At the same time, this Personnel Manager had to take on extra responsibilities. In the second study, one organization employing 300 staff in response to cuts in funding, and in an effort to protect services slimmed down its head office with the result that the HR Manager had her working week reduced from five days to four, with a subsequent pay cut. 

Such a diminishment in the HR role could also affect those that had come closest reaching the heights of ‘strategic business partner’. In the second study, for example, one HR Director revealed how he had gradually climbed through the organizational hierarchy from the position of HR Manager to HR Director with a seat on the board, reporting directly to the Chief Executive. This involved him having input into key decisions about income growth and providing the board with the employment implications of these decisions. Specific examples related to the alignment of organizational training and workforce accreditation initiatives to support this growth in activity. At the same time, towards the end of the field work he noted how a combination of a tightening of funding streams and a new senior executive who doubted the value of HR meant that he perceived HR issues were no longer being seen as central to the organization’s direction, with the result that he felt his own status on the board being undermined to the point where he resigned.

Discussion 
In exploring the status of the HR function within the voluntary sector in the New Labour era, this paper reveals a complex and diverse pattern of outcomes for HR specialists. At the same time, it does reveal some consistency across the two studies. In returning to the paper’s optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, the two studies revealed how these outcomes tended to be weighted towards the latter as even in the era of New Labour’s ‘partnership’ with the sector, contractual relations between purchasers and providers veered towards the ‘arms length’ rather than the obligational. There also appeared to be a degree of consistency regarding HR policy outcomes that were shaped by the inter-organizational environment. Moreover, in line with other studies of the HR function, the strategic role in both studies was in the minority, with Regulator and Adviser roles more prevalent. In explaining these outcomes, inter-organizational influences were important factors, but also interacted with other processes and actors. 

For some HR specialists, the influence of institutional norms appeared to be the catalyst for developing a presence in the sector on the lines of the Regulator role (Storey, 1992) as purchasers demanded compliance with employment law and best practice in policies such as discipline and recruitment. At the same time, the influence of institutional factors did not guarantee a straightforward route in establishing a HR presence in the sector as individual actors, sometimes in collaboration with other senior executives, had to engage in processes of persuasion and negotiation to establish a presence. 

Further, as in other studies (see Truss, et al, 2002,) the data suggested that for the HR function to progress beyond this role, respondents would have to engage in further active persuasion and negotiation. In this study, this was achieved through the ‘Advisory’ role, where HR specialists had to be seen to be effectively assisting line managers fulfil the organization’s mission, either in cutting absence or contributing to successful funding bids. This finding, in a similar vein to Gennard and Kelly’s work (2007) suggested how even where the influence of HR was not specifically focused at the senior board level, it can benefit from making important business-focused impacts to the wider organization. 

Power relations between purchaser and providers were also responsible for shaping the status of the function. The data suggested that where the organization was able to exercise some degree of strategic choice, the HR function was more insulated against the rigors of the competitive market and was more likely to develop a strategic role. Where relations with funders were more dependent and ‘arms-length’ this led to problems for the HR function. Here, even larger organizations saw HR as a cost, and others were unable to establish a stand alone function because of lack of resources. 

The management of risk by funders was also not conducive to HR respondents being seen as ‘employee champions’. Here, interference with discipline and grievance procedures meant that HR specialists could be bypassed in favour of the input of lawyers. Arguably, in the future, this situation could be exacerbated by the introduction of the Statutory Instrument (2070) that facilitated the Protection of Vulnerable Adults Regulations (2004). Already, union studies have shown how under these regulations employees can be suspended pending investigation and disciplined by external committees, even after internal procedures have been completed, with little recourse to employee representatives or HR as potential ‘employee champion’ (Cunningham and James, 2007).  

The particular culture of the sector collided with the dynamics of competitive market to the detriment of the HR function in other ways. As funding tightened findings revealed how despite the will and competencies of individual actors, the power relations between purchasers and providers could undermine efforts by HR specialists to construct a high profile within organizations. This challenging environment in the sector highlights how the function operates in continuous state of flux and change (See Truss, 2008 for further illustrations from the public sector). Moreover, to a degree it also reflects the continued wider problem associated with the function concerning identifying causal relationships between people management and organizational performance (Guest, Michie, Conway, and Sheehan, 2003: Hope-Hailey, Farndale, and Truss, 2005). It was also clear that other familiar factors inter-acted with the inter-organizational dimension to further determine the above outcomes. In particular, as with other studies (Kelly and Gennard, 2007) this paper revealed how the function could be vulnerable to short-term changes in market/funding conditions, but also how the intervention of Chief Executives or other senior managers could be crucial in ensuring the survival of the function in difficult circumstances. 

Conclusion
Caution has to be applied to the above results as they are not truly longitudinal. The two studies also do not include the insights of other key stakeholders such as line managers who can report on the value and status of HR.  Nevertheless, the paper concludes by observing that despite the voluntary sector relying on its workforce to deliver public services, its HR function can be as, or more, constrained, under-resourced and compromised as in parts of the private and public sectors, and that inter-organizational relations with the state contribute to these outcomes. There is also a broader lesson from this study, i.e. how the nature of inter-organizational relations in the UK veers largely towards the ‘arm’s length’ contracts (Marchington, et al, 2005). Consequently, as public and private organizations increasingly embark on purchaser-provider relations, the paper suggests that the dynamics of inter-organizational relations, certainly in the UK context, and possibly in other liberal economies such as the USA, can be added to the list of factors that make the achievement of a strategic role for the HR function difficult to attain, especially at the provider end of supply chains.
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